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By Attahiru M. Jega, OFR Department of political science Bayero University, Kano, Nigeria

Presentation at the National Democracy Day Anti-Corruption Summit, on the Theme: Curbing Electoral Spending: A Panacea to Public Corruption, June 11, 2019, Congress Hall, Transcorp Hilton Hotel, Abuja.

 

Introduction In many fundamental respects, worldwide, elections have become costly endeavors, for Governments and Election Management Bodies (EMBs), as well as for political parties, candidates and other stakeholders. In Africa, Election budgets and expenditures have increased phenomenally, especially in nascent democracies, in part due to “rapid population growth and civil conflicts” (UNECA 2013: 179), and in part due to what has been termed as integrity cost of elections, such as investment in technology to improve the electoral processes and increase public trust in them (ECONEC Study 2018). Indeed, Vijay Joshi’s observation (in India’s Long Road: The Search for Prosperity) about the rising costs of elections in the Indian context, is of general applicability to countries such as Nigeria: With increasing democratization, the number of elections has increased; with higher growth, winning elections has become much more lucrative and fighting elections has become much more expensive (2017: 237).

As election budgets and expenditures increased, so also have candidates’ nomination fees imposed by political parties, political party and candidate campaign expenditures, as well as costs of “election monitoring and observation” by international organizations and Civil Society groups.While some of the escalating costs are understandable, legally permissible and accounted for, a lot more are increasingly from illicit, unaccountable and none transparent political financing. And herein lies the major challenges to electoral integrity and democratic development in countries, such as Nigeria.

As a result of the escalating costs of elections, and the increasing use of illicit money by candidates and political parties to finance elections, as Norris and van Es have observed, “regulating political finance is a challenge facing many countries around the world” (2016: xi).

This presentation focuses on electoral spending by political parties and candidates, and its reliance on illicit sources of funding and its relatively unregulated nature, with dire consequences on electoral integrity and democratic development. Section one is a brief overview, while section 2 reviews the Nature and type of Campaign Spending and Voter Inducement. Section 3 reviews Campaign Spending and Vote Buying in contemporary Nigeria, followed in section 4 with a discussion on Curbing Campaign Spending and Vote Buying. Section 5, offers some recommendations while section 6 provides the conclusion.

1. Brief Overview Undoubtedly, a major challenge of greater concern than the rising cost to government (and EMB) of elections expenditure is the excessive, illegal and uncontrolled use of money in electoral politics, which undermines the integrity of elections and the desirable inclusiveness of democracies. It privatizes, commercializes and commoditizes participation in voting and elections. It unfairly obstructs and excludes those with little if any money from contesting elections and it undermines the integrity of elections by bringing forth unpopular but induced electoral outcomes. Negative, unregulated, use of money in politics and especially in elections has therefore become a matter of global concern. There are now increasing effort to see how to curb election spending and voter inducement in electoral democracies.

According to Walecki, “since the nineteenth century, most [mature] democracies have managed to eliminate the buying of votes and associated methods of election bribery” (2008: 4). (They may have substituted these with more sophisticated and opaque political financing methods.) However, in nascent democracies, such as Nigeria, these crude, vote buying methods are endemic and, indeed, in the Nigerian context, there appears to be a resurgence of these in recent times. Greater attention therefore needs to be focused on these: on how to curb or at least control and moderate the increasing cost of elections generally, and in particular the influence of illegal financing of electoral politics.

Nigeria is one of the nascent electoral democracies in which the vast potentials of democratic development are being rapidly undermined by negative uses of money in elections. In spite of expressed concerns and commendable efforts by INEC, in partnership with such organizations as IFES, anti-corruption agencies and citizens’ groups, only the surface of this insidious and negative phenomenon seems to have been scratched. Curbing this is necessary and all stakeholders have a role to play in this. Most especially, Regulatory and law enforcement agencies have crucial roles to play in this. It is important to recognize that negative use of money to influence electoral outcomes and voter inducement are all part of the endemic “bribe culture” in countries such as Nigeria. Dealing with them decisively and effectively has to therefore be within the context of an effective strategy for fighting corruption generally.

It has been observed that, “effective regulation of political finance can have many beneficial consequences, including strengthening equitable party competition, principles of transparency and accountability in public life, and overall integrity of the electoral process.” (Norris & van Es 2016:1).Political finance is defined by IDEA –PFD as ‘encompassing “all financial flows to and from political parties and candidates. It includes formal and informal income and expenditure, as well as financial and in-kind contributions. These transactions are not limited to a certain period” IDEA 2014). A narrower definition offered by Pinto-Duschinsky (2002) and promoted by IFES is that political finance is “money for electioneering” (IFES 2013). (Norris & van Es 2016: 6-7).

Although no doubt, “the last quarter-century has seen major advances in what we know about political finance rules” (Norris & van Es, 2016: 5), Nigeria has lagged behind this global trend. The existing regulatory framework is inadequate and needs to be remarkably improved upon. Constitutional and electoral act provisions concerning electoral spending need to be reviewed and tightened.

Specifically, campaign spending should be reviewed with limits imposed on individual contributions and party expenditures on candidates, and mechanisms for transparency in accounting for campaign expenditures by both parties and candidates need to be streamlined and/or imposed. The existing provisions regarding these in the Electoral Act 2010 As Amended (especially under Sections 88, 90, 91, 92, 93, 124, 147), are not only outdated, but also not being enforced. With the result that use of largely illicit campaign financing is having a decisive impact on electoral outcomes.

2. Nature and type of Campaign Spending and Voter Inducement Campaign spending and voter inducement range from those by political parties, candidates, so-called ‘money-bags’ or ‘godfathers’ (see Ayoade 2008: 85-96); and incumbent regimes. They are all part 6 and parcel of political finance-related corruption. Indeed, there are at least 10 types of political finance-related corruption.

A multi-pronged strategy and approach are desirable to address the challenging nature and complex dimensions of political financerelated corruption generally, and specifically campaign spending and voter inducement. While the existing legal framework for fighting political finance-related corruption in Nigeria leaves much to be desired, there is need for strict enforcement of campaign finance regulations, and re-orientation away from the pervasive and endemic culture of corruption in Nigeria. Both law enforcement and anticorruption agencies have significant roles to play, not just in detection, prosecution and enforcement, but also in sensitization, public engagement and enlightenment.

3. Campaign Spending and Vote Buying in contemporary Nigeria Return to civil democratic rule in Nigeria in 1999 did not represent a remarkable departure from the old ways and manner in which politics has been organized, parties have been funded, campaigns have been conducted, and voters have been induced. In both the First and Second Republics (1960-1966 & 1979-83), political financing was minimally based on conventional legally permissible sources, and maximally using illicit sources. The legitimate / legal funding sources include: membership dues, levies, proceeds from sales of party paraphernalia, proceeds from investments, interest on savings, fines, voluntary donations or subsidies. The illegal sources include: funding by foreign governments and/or organizations, criminal outfits, uncontrolled corporate donations, unlimited individual contributions, illegal deployment of state resources and facilities, privileges, etc., using incumbency to fund political parties, partisan political activities and campaigns, or to induce voters, etc.

Indeed, as Nigeria’s transition to democracy post-1999 moved from one election cycle to another, most of the old habits and bad old ways became resurgent and proliferated. Ethno-religious identity politics were reinforced with negative political financing and crass, if not crude, vote buying techniques. So called “Godfathers” and “money bags”, increasingly dominated the political terrain, fielding and funding lackeys as candidates in party primaries and in elections, undermining both internal party democracy and electoral integrity. New terminologies, such as “stomach infrastructure”, were used to legitimize or justify unwholesome actions and illegalities. Vote buying has become more brazen with party or candidates agents being deployed at polling stations, with bags of money to buy off voters, and with the security agents often looking the other way.

Then, collusive corruption proliferated. Political Parties and candidates budget funds for security agencies and electoral officials and pay them to commit electoral fraud, and declare false results or look the other way as their agents perpetrated electoral fraud. Some of these officials, having been induced, willingly collude to undermine the integrity of the electoral process.

The confidence and impunity with which political parties and candidates deploy resources to buy votes during elections is largely on account of the weak, inadequate and ineffectual response by the security agencies and lack of enforcement of the sanctions provided for in the legal framework. Perpetrators have thus become emboldened and reckless from one election to another. The current situation in Nigeria has been aptly summarized as follows:

The electoral process in Nigeria has become so expensive that only the rich or those dependent on the rich can run for political office. The absence of effective regulation of the amount of private funding that parties can receive from private sources has made all forms of political mercantilism attractive and possible.

There is a heavy reliance on private funding. Parties generate income through sale of nomination forms, fund-raising dinners, donations from party big wigs, contractors and those who control major sectors of the economy (AGR III: 2013: 190).

It is noteworthy that efforts have been made/ are being made to address the challenges. For example, IFES-Nigeria together with a range of stakeholders, especially INEC and political parties, have been working on political finance reform and the adoption of a regulatory framework for political finance disclosure, virtually since the advent of transition to civil democratic rule in Nigeria in 1999. IFES has established a “Political Finance Monitoring Group (PFMG), which includes representatives of nearly 50 organizations interested in clean elections, including political parties, the Independent national Electoral Commission, anti-corruption agencies, citizens’ groups, academia and the media” (Adetula 2008: vii). According to Adetula, “The Group tracks violations of Nigeria’s political finance laws and reports them to agencies that prosecute such crimes.” (Ibid).

But, in spite of these efforts, not much success has been recorded in containing the negative uses of money in elections and especially the phenomenon of vote buying. Thus, a lot more needs to be done to free Nigeria’s electoral process from the virtual stranglehold of negative campaign financing and voter inducement.

4. Curbing Campaign Spending and Vote Buying The current trend of campaign spending and vote buying in the Nigerian electoral process, which is becoming entrenched, is a major threat to Nigeria’s democratic development. Democratic consolidation would become a mirage, and democratic reversal a strong possibility, unless we urgently address this phenomenon. There is no doubt that stamping out electoral corruption and criminality would require fundamental reform of the financing of political parties and electoral laws. Now is the time to begin to do so, in the post-election / pre-election period of the next electoral cycle.

Also, significantly, curbing excessive illegal campaign finance and vote buying can only be decisively and meaningfully accomplished through the concerted effort of our security and anti-corruption agencies to enforce the legal framework, which itself needs to be remarkably improved upon through equally urgent, and effective reform processes.

5. Recommendations In view of the aforementioned, recommendations are advocated as follows:
6. Urgent Review of the existing legal framework, Constitution and Electoral Act, paying attention to strengthening political finance and vote buying legislations, is necessary and should commence immediately. All legal provisions concerning disclosure requirements (for accountability of political actors); contribution limits (as it affects behavior of funders); Spending limits (as it affects expenditure by candidates and parties); and public spending; should be reviewed, strengthened and improved upon in line with global best practices. The objective is to impose limits on campaign and general political finance spending, and impose stiff penalties for none compliance. For example, Sections 88, 90, 91, 92, 124 and 147 of the electoral Act 2010 As Amended need to be reviewed, updated, strengthened and then enforced.
7. Specifically,

2.1 Corporate contributions to political parties and candidates should be banned and strictly enforced

2.2 Ban on campaign and party contributions from abroad / foreign sources should be strictly enforced and violations sanctioned.

2.3 Candidate and party campaign expenditures should be set at a minimum threshold, be made transparent and be enforced.

2.4 Strengthen INEC’s capacity to monitor, audit party and candidate finances, with capacity to enforce and sanction persistent violations, including disqualifications.

2.5 The power to INEC granted under Section 90 of the Electoral Act 2010 As Amended, “… to place a limitation on the amount of money or other assets, which an individual group of persons can contribute to a political party”, which has hitherto not been exercised, must be brought into effect, with strict enforcement and sanctions. So also powers granted to the Commission under Sections 92(2) (3)(4), and 93(1) on regulation and monitoring as well as sanctioning election expenditures incurred by political parties.

2.6 As it has done with Security agencies under ICCESS, INEC needs to partner with anti-corruption agencies, to set up an inter-agency consultative committee for the monitoring, regulation and sanctioning of political finance-related corruption. This would send the right signal to politicians that it would henceforth not be business as usual.

3. Learn from, and adapt the Indian model, of requiring all parties and candidates to open dedicated websites on which they would transparently post all incomes and expenditures for political campaigns, which shall be monitored by the electoral commission and law enforcement and anti-corruption agencies. Any illegal contributions and/or expenditures can be identified, investigated and prosecuted as appropriate.
4. At the moment, there are virtually no legal provisions regulating the use of state resources and facilities by incumbent elected officers in political campaigns. There is need for specific and detailed regulation of this, as profound abuses occur in this regard. There are good practices globally, which we can learn from and adapt.
5. Election money laundering is a major unregulated threat to electoral integrity in Nigeria. Reform of the electoral legal framework should address this, and the anti-corruption agencies in particular should pay attention to this rising phenomenon and put mechanisms in place to detect, investigate and sanction this.
6. Strengthen the capacity and relative independence of security and anti-corruption agencies, as well as INEC, to monitor political actors and enforce compliance with the legal requirements of campaign financing and vote buying in the Constitution and the Electoral Act, without fear, partiality or favour. The security and anti-corruption agencies should, where appropriate, establish units with the sole mandate and purpose of monitoring campaign finance and vote buying and strictly enforcing legal provisions.
7. No matter how sound the regulatory framework is there is often a gap between robustness of regulations and enforcement. As Walecki observed, ‘fully independent enforcement mechanisms’ are necessary and required. Detection, investigation, and prosecutor agencies, as well as the judiciary need to be independent and impartial, effective and efficient, in handling established cases of illegal funding and financial transgressions. Efficiency and professionalism are absolute requirements in dealing with all electoral matters, and in particular campaign finance and vote buying. So also is the speed with which cases are swiftly investigated, prosecuted and dispensed with.
8. CSOs and NGOs need to build strong partnerships and alliances with INEC and the security and anti-corruption agencies, for monitoring illegal party funding, campaign financing and vote buying by both political parties and candidates; as well as the efficiency, effectiveness, professionalism and impartiality with which law enforcement and anti-corruption agencies tackle cases of vote buying and illegal election spending.
9. Other reforms to the administrative and legal framework for improving the integrity of elections should be pursued immediately early in the new electoral cycle.

 

6. Conclusion

As Pollock aptly observed, “healthy political life is not possible as long as the use of money is unrestrained” (1932: 32). The integrity of Nigeria’s electoral process, as well as democratic development is constantly and increasingly being assaulted by uncontrolled, negative deployment and use of corruption laden political financing. The legal framework for regulating political financing and voter inducement is not only weak, but even as it is, is not being adequately enforced. Either the security and anti-corruption agencies are overwhelmed by the challenges, or they are somehow condoning them. The current prevailing situation needs to change, through urgent reform measures, to bring out a stronger legal framework, with greater and enhanced capacity by the regulatory agencies and security, as well as anti-corruption agencies to enforce it. There is also the need for greater partnerships and collaboration between INEC, CSOs and security and anti-corruption agencies for effective tackling of political finance-related corruption. Electoral integrity is key for Nigeria’s democratic and socioeconomic development. All hands need to be on deck to protect and defend the integrity of elections in Nigeria against especially the assault mounted on it by the challenges of political finance and vote buying.

– June 21, 2018 @ 15:29 GMT |

Tags: Curbing Electoral Spending and Voter Inducement in Nigeria: The Role of Regulatory and Law Enforcement Agencies

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